

**PRE-RIGHTS PROJECT:**

Assessing impact and performance
of preventive measures
on EU Directives and Framework Decisions.

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Report on Prevention Practices
in Pre- and Post-Trials –
*Preventive Measures in the Context
of Counter-Radicalisation*

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>List of Tables</i>	7
<i>List of Boxes</i>	7
1. <i>Introduction</i>	9
2. <i>Key International Framework Documents on Preventing and Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism</i>	11
3. <i>Identification of Suspected Radicalised Individuals and/or Terrorist Suspects</i>	17
4. <i>Monitoring and Surveillance of Suspected Radicalised Individuals / Terrorist Suspects</i>	43
5. <i>Addressing the risk of returning foreign fighters, terrorist supporters, and terrorist recruiters</i>	65

List of Tables

TABLE 1: Actuarial vs. Structured Professional Judgement Approach

TABLE 2: Principal risk indicators in the VERA-2+REM

TABLE 3: SRG Risk Factors and Areas of Need

TABLE 4: HCR-20 at a Glance

TABLE 5: TRAP-18 at a Glance

TABLE 6: A List of Indicative Practices and Initiatives for Identifying Radicalisation

TABLE 7: A List of Indicative Initiatives and Practices for the Monitoring of Terrorist Suspects

TABLE 8: A List of Indicative Practices and Initiatives for Dealing with Returning Terrorist Fighters

List of Boxes

BOX 1: Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing

BOX 2: Good Practices for Responding to the FTF Phenomenon

1. Introduction

This report provides an overview of different types of approaches and measures that seek to address and tackle the risk of radicalisation. Radicalisation is a complex, multi-dimensional, and relational phenomenon which is closely linked to the threat of violent extremism and terrorism. Radicalisation is not a state but a process and, as such, it is usually not easy to identify until it manifests itself in a violent way. Preventing radicalisation is a key element of counter-terrorism and in the recent years, a burgeoning body of international documents has been developed and promulgated in an attempt to develop an integrated approach for preventing and countering violent extremism. Section 2 of the report examines the existing international framework for promoting effective action on preventing and countering radicalisation. To cover the issue of prevention and countering of radicalisation in a comprehensive manner, the report focuses on three inter-related themes:

- Identification of suspected radicalised individuals / terrorist suspects (Section 3).
- Monitoring/surveillance of suspected radicalised individuals / terrorist suspects (Section 4).
- Addressing the risk of returning foreign fighters, terrorist supporters, and terrorist recruiters (Section 5).

Each of these themes is described and indicative approaches and measures are presented.

2. Key International Framework Documents on Preventing and Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism

In 2015, the European Parliament adopted a *Resolution on the Prevention of Radicalisation and Recruitment of European Citizens by Terrorist Organisations*. With regard to the strengthening the deterrents against terrorist radicalisation, the Resolution noted that:

- measures aimed at preventing the radicalisation of European citizens and their recruitment by terrorist organisations will not be fully effective until they are accompanied by an effective, dissuasive and articulated range of criminal justice measures in all Member States; [...] through effectively criminalising terrorist acts carried out abroad with terrorist organisations the Member States will equip themselves with the tools needed to eliminate terrorist radicalisation among European citizens while making full use of the existing EU police and judicial cooperation tools in criminal matters; [...] law enforcement and justice authorities (judges and prosecutors) should have sufficient capacity to prevent, detect and prosecute those acts, and should be adequately and continuously trained on terrorism-related crimes;

and that:

- prosecuting terrorist acts carried out in third countries by European citizens or by non-EU nationals residing in the EU requires that the collection of evidence in third countries should be possible, on a basis of full compliance with human rights; [...] the EU [needs] to work on the setting-up of judicial and law enforcement cooperation agreements with third countries to facilitate the collection of evidence in said countries, provided that strict legal standards and procedures, the rule of law, international law and fundamental rights are safeguarded by all parties and under judicial control; [...] the

collection of evidence, interrogation and other such investigative techniques must be carried out subject to strict legal standards and must comply with EU laws, principles and values and international human rights standards; warns, in this connection, that the use of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, torture, extra-judicial renditions and kidnapping is prohibited under international law and may not take place for the purpose of collecting evidence of criminal offences committed inside the territory of the EU or outside its territory by EU nationals.¹

The European Commission's Communication on *Supporting the Prevention of Radicalisation leading to Violent Extremism* that was issued in 2016 has underscored the security dimension of counter-radicalisation:

Preventing and countering radicalisation has a strong security dimension [...]. Member States can take security measures to prevent young people from leaving to conflict zones to join terrorist groups. These include measures such as travel prohibitions, the criminalisation of traveling to a third country for terrorist purposes, but also measures through which families and friends can call upon the help of public authorities such as hotlines. Furthermore, extremist preachers and those disseminating terrorist propaganda or those recruiting vulnerable individuals may face criminal charges. Member States may issue travel bans to prevent extremist preachers from entering the EU, and may intervene against the dissemination of extremist messages through administrative measures. Such measures are the necessary complement to measures enhancing resilience against radicalisation.²

The European Commission has further underscored the critical role of information sharing and cooperation:

¹ [European Parliament Resolution of 25 November 2015 on the Prevention of Radicalisation and Recruitment of European Citizens by Terrorist Organisations, 2015/2063\(INI\)](#).

² Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, [Supporting the Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism](#), COM/2016/0379, 14 June 2016.

The EU's border management, migration and security cooperation frameworks and information tools need to be joined up, strengthened and fully used to effectively prevent EU citizens from travelling to conflict zones for terrorist purposes and detecting those that pose a risk upon their return. These and other frameworks and tools need to be used to exchange information of those suspected of radicalisation in order to facilitate the work of the relevant authorities across borders in taking the appropriate measures against persons representing a high security risk.³

In 2017, the EU adopted Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combatting terrorism which noted that:

To ensure the success of investigations and the prosecution of terrorist offences, offences related to a terrorist group or offences related to terrorist activities, those responsible for investigating or prosecuting such offences should have the possibility to make use of effective investigative tools such as those which are used in combating organised crime or other serious crimes. The use of such tools, in accordance with national law, should be targeted and take into account the principle of proportionality and the nature and seriousness of the offences under investigation and should respect the right to the protection of personal data. Such tools should, where appropriate, include, for example, the search of any personal property, the interception of communications, covert surveillance including electronic surveillance, the taking and the keeping of audio recordings, in private or public vehicles and places, and of visual images of persons in public vehicles and places, and financial investigations.⁴

³ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, [Supporting the Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism](#), COM/2016/0379, 14 June 2016.

⁴ [Directive \(EU\) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA](#).

Accordingly, Article 20 (1) of the Directive requires that Member States “take the necessary measures to ensure that effective investigative tools, such as those which are used in organised crime or other serious crime cases, are available to persons, units or services responsible for investigating or prosecuting” offences that fall within the compass of this Directive.⁵ Under Article 23 (1), in transposing and implementing the provisions of this Directive, Member States need to observe their obligations to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles stipulated in the Treaty of the EU.⁶

The *Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond* that was adopted in 2020 underscored the importance of law enforcement cooperation, including in terms of conducting joint digital investigations and enhancing information exchange for ensuring an effective response of terrorist attacks. In this regard, the Agenda has noted the need for a reliable analysis of the threat posed by persons regarded as terrorists or violent extremists and the utility of collecting battlefield evidence for prosecuting terrorist perpetrators.⁷

Several EU policy documents have highlighted the value of cooperation with the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF). The GCTF is an informal, a-political, multilateral counterterrorism (CT) platform that seeks to strengthen the international architecture for addressing 21st century terrorism.⁸ Central to the Forum’s overarching mission is the promotion of a strategic, long-term approach to counter terrorism and the violent

⁵ [Directive \(EU\) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA.](#)

⁶ [Directive \(EU\) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA.](#)

⁷ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, [A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond](#), COM/2020/795, 9 December 2020.

⁸ For further information, see [Global Counter-Terrorism Forum](#).

extremist ideologies that underpin it. It provides a forum for national CT officials and practitioners to meet with their counterparts from different regions to share experiences, expertise, strategies, tools, capacity needs, and capacity-building programs.⁹

The GCTF has issued a series of high-level declarations, statements, and recommendations which, while having non-binding character, aim to reinforce established principles and standards for countering the threat of terrorism and violent extremism. For example, the *Cairo Declaration on Counterterrorism and the Rule of Law: Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector* that was adopted in 2011 stresses:

the importance of having an effective criminal justice system, fully respectful of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including effective prevention, investigative, and prosecutorial, and judicial capacity, to ensure that persons who plan, perpetrate or support terrorist acts are brought to justice and the victims of terrorism are provided with the appropriate measures to address the harm done to them;

and reinforces that

in all circumstances counterterrorism practice and cooperation should be conducted in full accordance with applicable national and international law, including human rights, refugee, and international humanitarian law, as an indispensable part of a successful strategy to combat and prevent terrorism;¹⁰

⁹ For further information, see [Global Counter-Terrorism Forum](#).

¹⁰ Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, [Cairo Declaration on Counterterrorism and the Rule of Law: Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector](#), 22 September 2011.

The *Council of Europe Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2018-2022* has three inter-connected strands – the three P’s – Prevention, Prosecution and Protection:

- **Prevent terrorism:** both through criminal law and law enforcement measures aimed at disrupting terrorist attacks or their preparation and through multifaceted longer-term measures aiming at preventing radicalisation leading to terrorism, including countering recruitment, training, the dissemination of terrorist ideology and the financing of terrorism;
- **Prosecute terrorists:** ensuring that terrorist offences committed in Europe or abroad are investigated in the most efficient and quickest possible manner, also through effective judicial and international co-operation including the principle of *aut dedere aut iudicare* and that those responsible are brought to justice and answer for their acts, in respect of human rights and the rule of law;
- **Protect all persons** present on the territories of the member States against terrorism, providing for the security of the people and the protection of potential targets of terrorist attacks, including critical infrastructures and public spaces; provide assistance and offer support to victims of terrorism.¹¹

It is evident that the approach to countering terrorism and violent extremism adopted by the Council of Europe largely overlaps with the one implemented by the EU. A central element of both approaches is the importance of ensuring a balance between achieving national security goals and upholding human rights standards.

¹¹ Council of Europe, [Counter-Terrorism Strategy: 2018-2022](#), CM(2018)86, 4 July 2018.

3. Identification of Suspected Radicalised Individuals and/or Terrorist Suspects

Threat assessment and management is broadly defined as the set of investigative and operational techniques used by law enforcement professionals to identify, assess, and manage the risks of targeted violence and its potential perpetrators.¹² It has also been described as the process of gathering information to understand the threat of targeted violence posed by a person, and determining the level of targeted violence risk posed by an individual or group toward a specific target.¹³

There are multiple steps in the development of risk assessment tools:

1. Clarification of psycholegal issues;
2. Gathering relevant information;
3. Identification of risk factors;
4. Weighing and combining risk factors;
5. Determine preferred actions;
6. Communicate findings and opinions.¹⁴

¹² Andre Simons and J. Reid Meloy, “Foundations of Threat Assessment and Management” in V.B. van Hasselt and M.L. Burke (eds.) *Handbook of Behavioural Criminology*, Springer International: 2017.

¹³ Andre Simons and J. Reid Meloy, “Foundations of Threat Assessment and Management” in V.B. van Hasselt and M.L. Burke (eds.) *Handbook of Behavioural Criminology*, Springer International: 2017.

¹⁴ Stephen Hart, [The Evolution of the Structured Professional Judgement Approach to Risk Assessment](#), 15 April 2013, Royal Society of Scotland, Edinburgh, UK.

Fein et al. outline four fundamental principles that underlie threat assessment investigation and management:

- Violence is a process, as well as an act. Violent behaviour does not occur in a vacuum. Careful analysis of violent incidents shows that violent acts often are the culmination of long-developing, identifiable trails of problems, conflicts, disputes, and failures.
- Violence is the product of an interaction among three factors:
 - The individual who takes violent action.
 - Stimulus or triggering conditions that lead the subject to see violence as an option, “way out,” or solution to problems or life situation.
 - A setting that facilitates or permits the violence, or at least does not stop it from occurring.
- A key to investigation and resolution of threat assessment cases is identification of the subject’s “attack-related” behaviours. Perpetrators of targeted acts of violence engage in discrete behaviours that precede and are linked to their attacks; they consider, plan, and prepare before engaging in violent actions.
- Threatening situations are more likely to be successfully investigated and managed if other agencies and systems both within and outside law enforcement or security organizations are recognized and used to help solve problems presented by a given case. Examples of such systems are those employed by prosecutors; courts; probation, corrections, social service, and mental health agencies; employee assistance programs; victim’s assistance programs; and community groups.¹⁵

¹⁵ Robert Fein et al. ‘[Threat Assessment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence](#)’, *National Institute of Justice*, July 1995.

A threat assessment programme pursues several core objectives, *inter alia*:

- The identification of a potential perpetrator.
- Assessment of the risks of violence posed by a given perpetrator at a given time.
- Management of both the subject and the risks that the perpetrator presents to a given target.
- The prevention rather than the prediction of violence.
- Guiding intervention.
- Protecting convicts’ rights.
- Minimising professional liability.¹⁶

Assessments should be based on multiple sources of information to increase reliability. The sources should consist of:

- Actuarial data: about the individual and the offence.
- Dynamic factors: such as employment, housing, mental health, family support, etc. Changes in these factors in particular may form triggers to increase risk, or mitigating circumstances that reduce risk.
- Clinical factors: professional judgement and experience, using the personal and professional experience to assess the information collected through interviews and file reading.
- Information from partners in a multi-agency framework: information coming from social workers, the police, intelligence services, etc. about an individual’s case.¹⁷

¹⁶ Robert Fein et al. ‘[Threat Assessment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence](#)’, *National Institute of Justice*, July 1995; Stephen Hart, [The Evolution of the Structured Professional Judgement Approach to Risk Assessment](#), 15 April 2013, Royal Society of Scotland, Edinburgh, UK.

¹⁷ Stephen Hart, [The Evolution of the Structured Professional Judgement Approach to Risk Assessment](#), 15 April 2013, Royal Society of Scotland, Edinburgh, UK.

There are two principal approaches to developing threat and violence risk assessment tools: actuarial and structural professional judgement. A comparative description of both approaches is presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Actuarial vs. Structured Professional Judgement Approach

Actuarial Risk Assessment Instruments – Prediction	Structured Professional Judgement Guidelines – Prevention
Problem: the operator who lacks the cognitive skills and abilities that are needed to handle the task.	Problem: the task which requires the application of general knowledge and skills to a case at hand.
Solution: simplification and automation	Solution: structure and systematisation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Define risk as the probability of violence. Develop algorithms to estimate probabilities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Define risk as the uncertainty about violence. Develop procedures for planning action.
Empirically validated decision-making.	Evidence-based decision-making.

Source: Stephen Hart et al. 2016¹⁸

The development of the Structured Professional Judgement (SPJ) approach to risk assessment is considered a major advancement in the field of threat assessment and management.¹⁹ SPJ is defined as an “analytical method used to understand and mitigate the risk for interpersonal violence posed by individual people that is discretionary in essence but relies on evidence-based guidelines to systematize the exercise of dis-

¹⁸ Stephen Hart et al. ‘The Structured Professional Judgement Approach to Violence Risk Assessment’ in L. Craig and M. Rettenberger (eds.), *The Wiley Handbook on the Theories, Assessment and Treatment of Sexual Offending*, Wiley: 2016, pp. pp.643-666.

¹⁹ Stephen Hart et al. *A Concurrent Evaluation of Threat Assessment Tools for the Individual Assessment of Terrorism*, 3 June 2017, Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society.

cretion”.²⁰ SPJ decision support tools, also referred to as SPJ guidelines, “are specific evaluative devices or procedures developed according to the SPJ approach that are intended to assess and manage risk for specific forms of violence or in specific contexts”.²¹

SPJ measures typically include 20-30 risk factors chosen on the basis of a thorough review of the scientific literature, rather than based on the results of a single or small number of samples.²² This is done to enhance comprehensiveness of coverage in terms of risk factors, and to promote generalizability across settings and samples. The approach helps evaluators and decision-makers identify risk factors that are present and relevant to the individual being evaluated; risk reduction and management strategies; and relative risk level.

SPJ measures adopt non-algorithmic, non-numeric decision processes and risk estimates. They do so to avoid the pitfalls inherent in actuarial approaches, such as sample dependence, exclusion of potentially important risk factors, instability of precise probability estimates across samples, and the inherent difficulty in applying group-based probability estimates to individuals.²³ The SPJ model, rather, uses a simple, narrative approach to risk estimation, requiring evaluators to come to a decision

²⁰ Stephen Hart et al. “The Structured Professional Judgment Approach to Violence Risk Assessment: Origins, Nature, and Advances” in L. Craig & M. Rettenberger, *The Wiley Handbook on the Theories, Assessment, Treatment of Sexual Offending: Volume II. Assessment*, Oxford: Wiley, 2016, pp.643-666.

²¹ Stephen Hart et al. “The Structured Professional Judgment Approach to Violence Risk Assessment: Origins, Nature, and Advances” in L. Craig & M. Rettenberger, *The Wiley Handbook on the Theories, Assessment, Treatment of Sexual Offending: Volume II. Assessment*, Oxford: Wiley, 2016, pp.643-666; Stephen Hart et al. *A Concurrent Evaluation of Threat Assessment Tools for the Individual Assessment of Terrorism*, 3 June 2017, Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society.

²² This paragraph comes from Kevin Douglas et al. “Historical-Clinical-Risk Management-20, Version 3 (HCR-20): Development and Overview”, *International Journal of Forensic Mental Health*, vol.13 (2014), p.94.

²³ This paragraph comes from Kevin Douglas et al. “Historical-Clinical-Risk Management-20, Version 3 (HCR-20): Development and Overview”, *International Journal of Forensic Mental Health*, vol.13 (2014), p.94.

of low, moderate, or high risk. This estimate derives from the number and relevance of risk factors, the corresponding concern that a person will be violent in the future, and the anticipated nature and intensity of intervention or management strategies necessary to mitigate risk.

The SPJ approach is ultimately geared toward informing risk management plans so as to facilitate risk reduction.²⁴ All SPJ instruments contain dynamic, or changeable, risk factors. A large part of using SPJ approaches involves determining which dynamic risk factors are present and relevant, and using those to shape, monitor, and revise management plans over time. Most recently, the SPJ approach has expounded upon the benefit of case formulation and scenario planning to achieve the goals of optimal risk management and risk reduction.

The Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA, VERA2, VERA2+REM) is a risk assessment guide that has been developed as a consultative tool.²⁵ Starting from the premise that risk is ubiquitous-omnipresent, VERA has been developed specifically for risk assessment of radicalization to violent extremism (and terrorism). It covers identification (variables), evaluation (34 indicators in its latest version), and estimation of the level of risk, taking into account that the risk assessment for violence differ not only one kind of risk assessment. VERA provides a complex dynamic causal model to establish risk level measure for each indicator (low, medium, high and the overall risk).

VERA-2+REM features four categories of terrorism risk– ideologies, affiliations, grievances and moral emotions– presenting 34 risk indicators divided in five groups: Beliefs & Attitudes (7), Context 6 Intent (7), History

²⁴ This paragraph comes from Kevin Douglas et al. “Historical-Clinical-Risk Management-20, Version 3 (HCR-20): Development and Overview”, *International Journal of Forensic Mental Health*, vol.13 (2014), p.94.

²⁵ Elaine Pressman and John Flockton, “Calibrating Risk for Violent Political Extremists and Terrorists: the VERA 2 Structured Assessment”, *The British Journal of Forensic Practice*, vol.14:4 (2012), p.243.

& Capability (6), Commitment/Motivation (8) and Protective factors (5).²⁶ The risk value of every indicator is rated between low, medium and high to achieve an overall final risk assessment (Table 2).

Table 2: Principal risk indicators in the VERA-2+REM

BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES	CONTEXT AND INTENT	HISTORY AND CAPABILITY	COMMITMENT AND MOTIVATION	PROTECTIVE FACTORS
Commitment to ideology	Seeker, consumer of extremist material	Early exposure to proviolent militant ideology	Glorification of violent action	Re-interpretation of ideology, less rigid
Victims of injustice and grievances	Identification of target in response to perceived injustice	Network involved in violent action family, friends	Driven by criminal opportunism	Rejection of violence to obtain goals
Dehumanisation of identified targets		Prior criminal history of violence	Commitment to group/group ideology	Change of vision of enemy
Rejection of democratic society and values	Contacts with violent extremists	Tactical, paramilitary, explosives training	Driven by moral imperative/superiority	Involvement with non-violent, deradicalisation, offence-related programmes
Feelings of hate, discrimination, alienation	Anger and violent expressed intent	Extremist ideological training	Driven by excitement ad venture	
Hostility to national collective identity	Desire to die for cause and martyrdom			Community support for non-violence
Lack of empathy outside own group	Intent to pian violent action			Family support for non-violence
	Susceptible to influence, authority, indoctrination.			

Source: Elaine Pressman and John Flockton, 2012 ²⁷

²⁶ John Monahan, “The Individual Risk Assessment of Terrorism” in Gary LaFree and Joshua Freilich, *The Handbook of Criminology of Terrorism*, Wiley 2017.

²⁷ Elaine Pressman and John Flockton, “Calibrating Risk for Violent Political Extremists and Terrorists: the VERA 2 Structured Assessment”, *The British Journal of Forensic Practice*, vol.14:4 (2012), pp. 237-251; Elaine Pressman, *Risk Assessment Decisions for Violent Political*, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2009.

Several different studies have been carried out with the goal of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of VERA.²⁸

The Extremist Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG 22+) has been developed by the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) in the UK to assess risk and needs in convicted extremist offenders in England and Wales, and for the assessment of those offenders for whom there are credible concerns about their potential to commit such offences.²⁹ The ERG 22+ has been designed to provide an empirically-based systematic and transparent approach to the assessment of risk to inform proportionate risk management; to increase understanding and confidence amongst front-line staff and decision-makers; and to facilitate effective and targeted intervention. Learning from casework with offenders, from government commissioned research and the wider literature is presented in the form of 22 general factors (with an opportunity to capture additional idiosyncratic factors, i.e., 22+) that contribute to an individual formulation of risk and needs that bears on three dimensions of engagement, intent

²⁸ Nicola Beardsley and Anthony Beech, "Applying the Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA) to a Sample of Terrorist Case Studies", *Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research*, vol.5:1 (2013), pp.4-15; Andrew Silke, "Risk Assessment of Terrorist and Extremist Prisoners", in Andrew Silke (ed.) *Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform*, London: Routledge, 2014, pp.108-121; Kiran M. Sarma, "Risk Assessment and the Prevention of Radicalization from Nonviolence into Terrorism", *American Psychologist*, vol. 72:3 (2017), pp.278-288; Stephen Hart et al. *A Concurrent Evaluation of Threat Assessment Tools for the Individual Assessment of Terrorism*, 3 June 2017, Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society; Akimi Scarcella et al. "Terrorism, Radicalisation, Extremism, Authoritarianism and Fundamentalism: A Systematic Review of the Quality and Psychometric Properties of Assessments", *PLOS One*, December 2016; Geoff Dean and Graeme Pettet, "The 3 R's of Risk Assessment for Violent Extremism", *Journal of Forensic Practice*, vol. 19:2 (2017), pp. 91-101; Elaine Pressman and John Flockton, "Violent Extremist Risk Assessment: Issues and Applications of the VERA-2 in a High Security Correctional Setting" in Andrew Silke (ed.) *Prisons, Terrorism and Extremism: Critical Issues in Management, Radicalisation and Reform*, London: Routledge, 2014; Martine Herzog-Evans, "A Comparison of Two Structured Professional Judgment Tools for Violent Extremism and Their Relevance in the French Context", *European Journal of Probation*, vol.10:1 (2018), pp.3-27.

²⁹ See M Lloyd and C Dean, "The Development of Structured Guidelines for Assessing Risk in Extremist Offenders", *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, vol.2:1 (2015), pp.40-52.

and capability. The ERG 22+ evolved from an earlier version of the Structured Risk Guidance (SRG) which was developed in 2009.³⁰

The SRG pursued the following objectives:

- To help staff working in prison and the probation service consider the different areas of an offender's life which may influence their potential to commit an extremist offence.
- To assist prison and probation staff take the appropriate steps to prevent future offending.³¹

The initially defined factors as part of SRG are presented in Table 3.

Table 3: SRG Risk Factors and Areas of Need

1. Lack of emotional resilience
2. Problems with relationships
3. Need to feel important, valued or special
4. Need for identity, meaning and belonging
5. Feelings of threat and insecurity
6. Sensitivity to perceived injustice
7. Idealism and political naivety
8. Susceptibility to charismatic individual(s)
9. Susceptibility to indoctrination
10. Susceptibility to group influence and control
11. The family and/or community support extremist offending
12. Over-identification with a cause
13. Attitudes that justify offending

³⁰ Stephen Webster et al. *A Process Evaluation of the Structured Risk Guidance for Extremist Offenders*, 2017, Ministry of Justice Analytical Series.

³¹ Stephen Webster et al. *A Process Evaluation of the Structured Risk Guidance for Extremist Offenders*, 2017, Ministry of Justice Analytical Series.

14. 'Us and Them Thinking'
15. Need for stimulation and excitement
16. Desire to experience themselves as a hero, soldier or person of honour
17. Intent to bring about harmful regime change
18. Opportunistic involvement
19. Individual knowledge, skills and competencies to commit extremist offences
20. Access to networks, funding and equipment to commit extremist offences
21. Diagnosis of Mental Illness & Personality Disorder
22. Any Other Area Relevant to Risk

Source: Stephen Webster et al. 2017³²

Another tool is the Multi-Level Guidelines (MLG).³³ The MLG defines group-based violence as the actual, attempted, or threatened physical injury of others that is deliberate and unauthorized, perpetrated by one or more people whose decisions and behaviour are influenced by a group to which they belong or with which they are affiliated. Thus, the concept of group-based violence includes the majority of terrorism, with the exception of some lone actor terrorism; but it also includes many forms of violence that is not terrorism (e.g., violence committed by criminal organizations, street gangs, new religious movements, clans, and ideologically-focused groups).

³² See Stephen Webster et al. *A Process Evaluation of the Structured Risk Guidance for Extremist Offenders*, 2017, Ministry of Justice Analytical Series.

³³ The description of the Multi-Level Guidelines is taken from Stephen Hart et al. *A Concurrent Evaluation of Threat Assessment Tools for the Individual Assessment of Terrorism*, 3 June 2017, Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society.

Broadly speaking, as its name implies, the focus of the MLG is on individual within-group dynamics relevant to violence—that is, individual and group dynamics that factors with and influence each to enhance or mitigate violence risk, based on a nested ecological model of violence. MLG is recommended for use in conjunction with other relevant risk assessment tools to evaluate people who are known or suspected to have committed terrorist group-based violence, as well as those who may be at risk for terrorist group-based violence. The MLG may also be used to analyse the extent to which the terrorist violence perpetrated by a person should be considered group-based versus individual (lone actor).

The 16 basic risk factors in the second version of the MLG (there were 20 risk factors in the first version) reflect four conceptual levels or domains of dynamics: Individual, Individual-in-Group, Group, and Group-in-Society. The Individual domain comprises factors relevant to people as individuals, irrespective of any groups to which they belong or are affiliated (e.g., mental health problems). These factors were modelled directly after those in the HCR-20 V3; indeed, the MLG manual permits evaluators to use the HCR-20 V3 risk factors as a substitute for the Individual domain factors in the MLG (Table 4).

Table 4: HCR-20 at a Glance

VIOLENCE RISK		
HISTORICAL	CLINICAL	RISK MANAGEMENT
Past (Static)	Present (Dynamic)	Future (Speculative)
Documented	Observed	Projected
10 Items	5 Items	5 Items
History of problems with...	Recent problems with...	Future problems with...
H1 Previous violence a. As a child (12 and under) b. As an adolescent (13-17) c. As an adult (18 and over)	C1 Lack of insight a. Mental disorder b. Violence risk c. Need for treatment	R1 Plans / professional services lack feasibility R2 Living situation / exposure to destabilisers R3 Lack of personal support R4 Treatment or supervision response / noncompliance with remediation attempts a. Compliance b. Responsiveness R5 Stress or coping
H2 Other anti-social behavior a. As a child (12 and under) b. As an adolescent (13-17) c. As an adult (18 and over)	C2 Negative attitudes / violent ideation / intent C3 Symptoms of major mental disorder a. Psychotic disorder. b. Major mood disorder. c. Other major mental disorders.	
H3 Relationship instability a. Intimate b. Non-intimate		
H4 Employment		
H5 Substance use	C4 Impulsivity / instability a. Affective b. Behavioural c. Cognitive	
H6 Major mental disorder a. Psychotic disorder b. Major mood disorder c. Other major mental disorders	C5 Treatment or supervision response / unresponsive to treatment a. Compliance b. Responsiveness	
H7 Personality disorder a. Anti-social, psychopathic, and dissocial. b. Other personality disorders.		
H8 Traumatic experiences a. Victimization / trauma b. Adverse childrearing experience		
H9 Violent attitudes		
H10 Treatment or supervision response		

Source: Kevin Douglas and Laura Guy, 2012³⁴

The Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18) is specifically designed to identify lone-actor terrorists.³⁵ It comprises 18 coded behavioural patterns (Table 5).

³⁴ Based on Kevin Douglas and Laura Guy, *Overview of Structured Professional Judgement and the HCR-20*, Webinar sponsored by NASMHPD's Forensic Division with support from SAMHSA's National Technical Assistance Center for State Mental Health Agencies, 28 June 2012, available at https://www.nasmhpd.org/sites/default/files/HCR%2020_Webinar%20June%2028.pdf; Kevin Douglas et al. "Historical-Clinical-Risk Management-20, Version 3 (HCR-20): Development and Overview", *International Journal of Forensic Mental Health*, vol.13 (2014), p.98.

³⁵ Reid Meloy and Paul Gill, "The Lone-Actor Terrorist and the TRAP-18", *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, vol.3:1 (2016), pp.37-52.

Table 5: TRAP-18 at a Glance

TRAP-18

WARNING BEHAVIOUR TYPOLOGY	DISTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LONE-ACTOR TERRORIST
<p>Pathway warning behaviour: research, planning, preparation, or implementation of an attack.</p> <p>Fixation warning behaviour: an increasingly pathological preoccupation with a person or a cause, accompanied by a deterioration in social and occupational life.</p> <p>Identification warning behaviour: a psychological desire to be a pseudocommando, have a warrior mentality.</p> <p>Novel aggression warning behaviour: an act of violence that appears unrelated to any targeted violence pathway and is committed for the first time.</p> <p>Energy burst warning behaviour: an increase in the frequency or variety of any noted activities related to the target, even if the activities themselves are relatively innocuous, usually in the days, weeks, or hours before the attack.</p> <p>Leakage warning behaviour: the communication to a third party of an intent to do harm to a target through an attack.</p> <p>Last resort warning behaviour: evidence of a "violent action imperative" and "time imperative".</p> <p>Directly communicated threat warning behaviour: the communication of a direct threat to the target or law enforcement beforehand.</p>	<p>Personal grievance and moral outrage: join both personal life experience and particular historical, religious, or political events.</p> <p>Framed by an ideology: the presence of beliefs which justify the terrorist's intent to act.</p> <p>Failure to affiliate with an extremist group: defined by the actual failure or rejection of the lone-actor terrorist from a radical or extremist group with which he wants to join.</p> <p>Dependence on the virtual community: active communication with others through social media etc. about one's radical or extreme beliefs.</p> <p>Thwarting of occupational goals: a major setback or failure in a planned academic and/or occupational life course.</p> <p>Changes in thinking and emotion: when thoughts and their expression become more strident, simplistic, and absolute.</p> <p>Failure of sexual-intimate pair bonding: coded if the subject has historically failed to form a lasting sexually intimate relationship.</p> <p>Mental disorder: coded if there was evidence of a major mental disorder by history or at present.</p> <p>Greater creativity and innovation: coded if there was evidence of tactical thinking "outside the box".</p> <p>Criminal violence: coded if there is evidence of instrumental criminal violence in the subject's past.</p>

Source: Reid Meloy and Paul Gill, 2016 ³⁶

³⁶ Reid Meloy and Paul Gill, "The Lone-Actor Terrorist and the TRAP-18", *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, vol.3:1 (2016), pp.37-52.

Putting the various existing instruments and methodologies for risk assessment into practice requires embedding the concepts of countering radicalisation in the daily professional work of frontline practitioners in different sectors, whether security-related or not. For example, the Radicalisation Awareness Network has published an extensive collection on approaches and practices aimed at preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism. Examples of relevant initiatives and approaches that are relevant to the identification of radicalised individuals and terrorist suspects are provided in Table 6.

Table 6: A List of Indicative Practices and Initiatives for Identifying Radicalisation

(note: All voices that start below are marked as "training" The final sections marked with a gray background are marked as "other")

NAME OF PRACTICE/ MEASURE / APPROACH	KEY DETAILS	TARGET AUDIENCE <i>i.e.</i> , to whom the practice is addressed	ACTOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRACTICE <i>(e.g.</i> , Government, civil society, citizens, communities, faith/religious groups, researchers, businesses, private partners)	REFERENCE
Belgian Prison Administration – Prevention of Radicalisation in Prisons HELP programme ONLINE Course	Training for first-line practitioners Radicalisation prevention courses on the Council of Europe platform To improve the criminal justice response in the EU to prevent radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism	Health practitioners Prison/probation/ judicial practitioners (judges, prosecutors)	Governments National training institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 28-30. • Council of Europe, HELP Online Courses.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Federal Agency for reception of asylum seekers – Training staff members of reception centers on prevention and reporting of radicalisation	Training for first-line practitioners Training for reception center and support services staff to prevent, identify and report radicalisation	All staff members of reception centers and agents of other public institutions	Experts Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp.57-58. Sude (B.), 'Prevention of Radicalization to Terrorism in Refugee Camps and Asylum Centers', in Schmid (A.), <i>Handbook of Terrorism prevention and preparedness</i>, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism: The Hague (Netherlands), 1st edition, 2020, pp. 247-281.
Institute of Social Safety (IBS) – Security and Radicalisation training at Polish schools	Training for first-line practitioners Training workshops on security and radicalisation to all school staff	School staff (both teachers and administrative staff) of primary and secondary schools	Civil society Experts Organisations/ONGs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Wiśniewski (R.) and Gwoździwicz (S.), 'Preventive anti-terrorist actions in the Polish School', <i>International Journal of Legal Studies</i>, Międzynarodowy Instytut Innowacji: Warsaw (Poland), n°2, issue 6, 2019, pp. 301-320. European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 69-70.
Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau – Handbook on warning behaviours	Training for first-line practitioners Theoretical and practical knowledge on radicalisation	Law enforcement officers Prison/probation/ judicial practitioners First responders or practitioners	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp.79-81.
Ministry of Justice of Belgium/European Union - Training for prison guards – 'Identification of signs of radicalisation'	Training for first-line practitioners COPPPRA-training on how to recognize signs of radicalisation in prison	Prison/probation/ judicial practitioners	Governmental institution (prison service)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 85-86. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), <i>Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremisms and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach</i>, OSCE: Vienna (Austria), 2014, p. 108.
Community; Policing and the Prevention of Radicalization (COPPPRA) Project				

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Police Academy of the Netherlands – Training at the Police Academy	Training for first-line practitioners Training about Counter Terrorism, Extremisms and Radicalisation (CTR)	Authorities First responders or practitioners Law enforcement officers	Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weert (A) and Eijkman (Q.), 'In every artery of Society? How Dutch Community Police Officers Perceive Their Role in Early Detection of Violent Extremism among Youth', <i>Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice</i>, 2020, pp. 1-14. European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 90-92.
RecoRa Institute	Training for first-line practitioners Resources to develop local expertise to counter radicalisation and violent extremism (e.g., training manuals, student handbooks, digital courses)	Authorities First responders or practitioners Local Community Organisations/ NGOs	Civil society Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 95-97.
The School & Safety Foundation (Stichting School & Veiligheid) – Education approach Radicalisation and Social Safety	Training for first-line practitioners Practical training for teachers to deal with the topic of radicalisation within their schools	Educators/ academics Authorities First responders of practitioners	Local community Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 110-112.
Various European States – Supporting schools and teachers in preventing and countering violent extremism	Training for first-line practitioners Programmes and initiatives in schools in EU Member States	Educators/ academics/ teachers Authorities First responders of practitioners	Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), <i>Education and radicalisation prevention: Different ways governments can support schools and teachers in preventing/ countering violent extremism</i>, RAN Collection, 2019 Ex post paper.
Trifler Training and Radar Consultancy – Working with Potentially Violent Loners in the Care Sector	Training for first-line practitioners Three-stage process addressing various themes related to radicalisation, including the identification of signs of radicalisation	Health practitioners First responders or practitioners Educators/ academics	Companies Experts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 115-116. Ellis (C.) e.a., <i>Lone-Actor Terrorism</i>, Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series, n°11, 2016.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
UK NCTP HQ – Operation Bachelor and Graduate	Training for first-line practitioners Discussion exercises to build awareness of the identification and response to vulnerability and radicalisation in a university context	Authorities Educators/ academics Youth/ pupils/ students	Government	• European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i> , RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 122-123.
UK NCTP HQ – ISDEP training	Training for first-line practitioners Training package and platform to help frontline practitioners dealing with vulnerable individuals to recognize, prevent and respond to all forms of radicalisation	First responders or practitioners General public Online	Government	• European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i> , RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 126-127.
Office for Security and Counter Terrorism – Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP)	Training for first-line practitioners Workshop to enhance one's ability to recognize potentially vulnerable individuals who may be at risk of radicalisation	First responders or practitioners Educators/ academics Health practitioners Individuals	Governmental institution Train the trainer (practitioners)	• European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i> , RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 128-129.
Various promising or existing training programmes in European Member States	Prison and probation interventions Police officers training	First line practitioners	Government Multi-agency panel	• Lenos (S.) and Keltjens (M.), <i>RAN POL's Guide on Training Programmes for Police Officers in Europe</i> , RAN Centre of Excellence, 2016, pp. 18-35.
BSAFE LAB University of Beira Interior — R2PRIS Multi-level In-prison Radicalisation Prevention Approach	Prison and probation interventions Tools to identify risks, and screen and assess inmates that may be at risk of becoming radicalized	First responders or practitioners Law enforcement officers Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners Frontline staff trainers	Experts Academics Government	• Ionescu (A.) <i>e.a.</i> , <i>R2PRIS Methodological Framework</i> , 2016. • European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i> , RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 643-647.
Catalan Penitentiary System — Sociocultural and behavioural keys of violent radicalization	Prison and probation interventions Prison staff training to identify radicalization indicators	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners Prison guards, prison rehabilitation staff, probation staff and the juvenile justice system staff	Government	• European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i> , RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 648-649.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Criminal sanction agency and Vantaa prison – Identification of violent extremism and radicalisation in Finnish prisons	Prison and probation interventions Project to detect and identify radicalisation among the prison population.	Prison/probation/ judicial practitioners First responders or practitioners Law enforcement officers NGO partners Religious community representatives	Governmental organisation	• European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i> , RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 650-653. • Finland - Ministry of the Interior, <i>National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism 2019-2023</i> , 2019.
General Secretariat of Penitentiary Institutions Vice-Directorate General for Institutional Relations and Regional Coordination — Risk assessment instrument in the Spanish prison context	Prison and probation interventions To detect radicalization in the prison context through several factors	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners Violent extremists	Governmental organisation	• European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i> , RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 663-665.
Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) – E-learning understanding and addressing extremism in prisons and probation	Prison and probation interventions E-learning package to increase awareness for people working with offenders considered vulnerable to extremism.	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners First responders or practitioners	Governmental authorities	• European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i> , RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 666-667.
Ministry of Justice in Austria – Seminar and training for prison staff	Prison and probation interventions Face-to-face seminar providing an overview of terrorist groups and covering indicators of radicalisation	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners	Governmental authorities	• European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i> , RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 676-677.
Ministry of Justice in France – Training of on-site referee trainers (ORT) on violent Islamist radicalisation awareness in detention	Prison and probation interventions Training sessions for correctional intelligence officers and trainers on radicalisation	Prison/probation/ judicial practitioners Law enforcement officers	Governmental authorities Experts	• European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i> , RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 678-679.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Ministry of Justice in Italy – Training courses on violent radicalisation and proselytism in prisons	Prison and probation interventions Training to recognize relevant signs and improve information-sharing	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners Educators/ academics Health practitioners Professionals	Governmental authorities Professionals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 680-681. Marone (F.) and Olimpio (M.), <i>Jihadist radicalization in Italian Prisons: A Primer</i>, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 2019.
National Administration of Penitentiaries (Romania) – Training sessions on the phenomenon of radicalisation, under the aegis of the Strategy for the prevention of radicalisation in the penitentiary environment	Prison and probation interventions Training courses delivered to prison units to identify radicalisation indicators.	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners	Governmental institution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 682-683.
Netherlands, National Counter Terrorism Coordination (NCTV) – Training for the prison sector	Prison and probation interventions Training offered for professionals working within the prison sector to signal and interpret radicalization	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners First responders or practitioners Governmental authorities	Experts Academic Professionals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Veer (R.), Bos (W. and Heide (L.), <i>Fusion Centres in Six European Countries: Emergence, Roles and Challenges</i>, 2019. European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 684-686.
National School for Training of Prison Agents Tîrgu Ocna, Romania — Train-the-Trainer for future prison officers	Prison and probation interventions Different courses on radicalisation e.g. factors that influence radicalisation, specific features of radicalisation in the penitentiary system	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners Future prison officers (students)	Governmental institution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 687-688.
Germany, NeDic – Network for Deradicalisation in Corrections	Prison and probation interventions Training courses to raise awareness among correctional staff of EPs' motivation, behavior, and indicators of radicalisation.	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners Authorities Violent extremists	Governmental institution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 691-694.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Strafvollzugsakademie – Training modules for prison staff	Prison and probation interventions Basic training modules and further education for prison staff in order to raise their awareness and empower them in the field of intervention and prevention	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners Health practitioners First responders or practitioners	Governmental institution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 698-699.
The national security unit and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service – Train-the-trainer awareness training and resource persons	Prison and probation interventions To provide awareness training for staff locally and ensuring close support and spare in the identification, assessment and tackling of extremism issues	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners First responders or practitioners	Governmental institution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 700-701.
The National Penitentiary Administration – Bucharest – Multi-disciplinary teams in Romanian prison system	Prison and probation interventions To increase awareness and recognition (early recognition) Online courses (available on Coursera)	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners Individuals	Governmental institution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 702-703.
The Netherlands Institute of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology (NIPF), Handbook	Prison and probation interventions Violent Extremism Risk Assessment handbook (version 2-revised) to analyze and assess the risk of violent extremism	Law enforcement officers Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners Authorities	Government Experts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 704-708.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
The Police academy of the Czech Republic – The manifestation of extremism and radicalisation inside Czech prisons	Prison and probation interventions Educational course about extremism and radicalisation	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners First responders or practitioners Authorities Also applicable in security bodies and relevant institutions e.g., facilities for the detention of foreigners, refugee centers, educational environments, healthcare facilities and hospitals	Governmental institution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 713-715. • Brunová (M.) and Vegríchtová (B.), 'The Manifestation of Terrorism and Extremism in Prisons', <i>Security Dimensions. International and National Studies</i>, n°31, 2019, pp. 110-116.
The Supplemental education department at the University College of Norwegian Correctional Services (KRUS) – Basic training for correctional officers	Prison and probation interventions Cross-disciplinary training to empower staff to recognize some overall signs of radicalisation	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners First responders or practitioners Law enforcement officers	Academics Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 716-718.
Training Centre of the Corps of Prison (Slovakia) – Training sessions in Slovakian prisons	Prison and probation interventions Specialized training on the identification of signs of radicalisation	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners	Academics Governmental institution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 719-720.
Arq Psychotrauma Expert Group – TERRA Toolkit	Community engagement and empowerment Network-based prevention and learning project to identify and halt the progress of an individual on a path to radicalisation Information exchanges	First responders or practitioners (teachers, youth workers) Law enforcement officers Religious leaders Local policymakers Local Community Organisations/ NGOs	Professionals and experts Organisations/NGOs Company	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 218-220. • Maniscalco (M.) and Rosato (V.) eds., <i>Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Policies</i>, Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 2019.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Violence prevention network – On/Off Derad model (no longer running)	Delivering counter or alternative narratives Online and offline de-radicalisation interventions through social media Detection of young people at risk of radicalisation through their sharing/ liking of content on social media or their spending time in relevant forums and chat rooms of extremist groups	Online users Youth/pupils/students	Organisations/NGOs Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 586-588.
Local Prevention Council Augsburg (LPC) – Augsburg's network for the prevention of radicalisation	Multi-agency approach To sensitize stakeholders and practitioners to the signs of radicalisation (notably with Project Bounce, Project Krass)	Local community organizations/NGOs First responders or practitioners Educators / academics	Local community Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 615-617.
The Danish SSP system	Multi-agency approach Local collaboration between schools, social services, and police, aiming at identifying risk factors e.g., children or young people exhibiting at-risk behavior or signs of neglect	Youth/ pupils/ students	Community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 625-628.
UK NCTP HQ – Channel	Multi-agency approach Program aiming at identifying individuals at risk	Authorities Law enforcement officers Local Community Organisations/ NGOs	Multi-agency panel Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 631-632.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
PI Vught – Terrorist Wing Vught	Prison and probation interventions Prison regime: Placement of persons convicted of terrorism, charged with terrorist activities and those showing signs and behavior of radicalisation in prison	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners Violent extremists Authorities	Governmental institution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 695-697. • Inspectorate of Justice and Security, <i>The Terrorist Detention Units in the Netherlands</i>, 2019.
PI Vught – Terrorist Wing Vught	Prison and probation interventions Prison regime: Placement of persons convicted of terrorism, charged with terrorist activities and those showing signs and behavior of radicalisation in prison	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners Violent extremists Authorities	Governmental institution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 695-697. • Inspectorate of Justice and Security, <i>The Terrorist Detention Units in the Netherlands</i>, 2019.
Arq Psychotrauma Expert Group – TERRA Toolkit	Community engagement and empowerment Network-based prevention and learning project to identify and halt the progress of an individual on a path to radicalisation Information exchanges	First responders or practitioners (teachers, youth workers) Law enforcement officers Religious leaders Local policymakers Local Community Organisations/ NGOs	Professionals and experts Organisations/NGOs Company	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 218-220. • Maniscalco (M.) and Rosato (V.) eds., <i>Preventing Radicalisation and Terrorism in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Policies</i>, Cambridge Scholars Publishing: 2019.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Violence prevention network – On/Off Derad model (no longer running)	Delivering counter or alternative narratives Online and offline de-radicalisation interventions through social media Detection of young people at risk of radicalisation through their sharing/ liking of content on social media or their spending time in relevant forums and chat rooms of extremist groups	Online users Youth/pupils/students	Organisations/NGOs Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 586-588.
Local Prevention Council Augsburg (LPC) – Augsburg's network for the prevention of radicalisation	Multi-agency approach To sensitize stakeholders and practitioners to the signs of radicalisation (notably with Project Bounce, Project Krass)	Local community organizations/NGOs First responders or practitioners Educators / academics	Local community Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 615-617.
The Danish SSP system	Multi-agency approach Local collaboration between schools, social services, and police, aiming at identifying risk factors <i>e.g.</i> , children or young people exhibiting at-risk behavior or signs of neglect	Youth/ pupils/ students	Community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 625-628.
UK NCTP HQ – Channel	Multi-agency approach Program aiming at identifying individuals at risk	Authorities Law enforcement officers Local Community Organisations/ NGOs	Multi-agency panel Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Commission, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i>, RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, 2019 Edition, pp. 631-632.

4. Monitoring and Surveillance of Suspected Radicalised Individuals / Terrorist Suspects

Communities play an important role in combatting radicalisation and violent extremism and hence, can contribute to the development of an effective security web that does not allow the permeation and spread of extremist narratives. Such a web can also facilitate surveillance in case community members are suspected of engagement with violent extremism and terrorism. This can enable timely intelligence gathering that is often vital to the uncovering of conspiracy and planning to carry out violent attacks. Empowering communities so that they can effectively join forces with law enforcement and security agencies in monitoring terrorist suspects requires carefully developed and implemented community engagement strategies that take into account the structure, composition, and different needs of individual communities. In particular, activities within community engagement and empowerment can have an impact on achieving the following goals:

- Identifying individuals or groups at risk by communities and more specifically key figures within the community. Communities can act as an “early warning system for the police and intelligence services should they come across information or have concerns about particular individuals or groups.
- Providing support systems for neighbourhoods, families or parents (e.g. parenting skills) related to individuals at risk.
- Providing information that could help authorities, such as preventing individuals from travelling to dangerous conflict zones overseas.³⁷

³⁷ Radicalisation Awareness Network, *Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Community Engagement and Empowerment*, 2019.

One size does not fit all; however, an indispensable element for the successful deployment and use of community engagement strategies is the need for promoting and building trust between communities and security services.

The GCTF *Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as Tools to Counter Violent Extremism* address the local dimension of radicalisation and violent extremism. The underlying assumption is that “the more aware communities are of potential threats to their security, the more empowered they are to be resilient against it and the better prepared they can be to counter the threats themselves.”³⁸ Box 1 summarises the set of good practices that the GCTF has identified.

Box 1: Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing

GOOD PRACTICE 1	Approach community engagement and community-oriented policing as long-term, sustained strategies, not short-term tactics, and do the requisite research in order to understand local problems and grievances so that a local community is not targeted for security reasons but is engaged for its own benefit.	Community engagement requires building trust between officials and community members in order to establish a relationship of collaboration. Experience proves that such relationships cannot be built overnight and should be cultivated and maintained over time in order to have effect. In community-oriented policing, initiatives should focus on proactively engaging the local community to share information and better serve their needs – not just employing traditional law enforcement methods or gathering security-related information.
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³⁸ Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, *Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as Tools to Counter Violent Extremism*, 2013.

GOOD PRACTICE 2	Establish the methods with which to build trust in the community.	If possible, it is helpful to use officials who come from a similar culture and background to the community with which they are engaging; this can help facilitate trust. Openness, candour and humour are powerful tools in the hands of engaging officials however, humour should be used with great care, as it does not always translate well across cultures. Engaging officials need to be accessible to communities when communities need them.
GOOD PRACTICE 3	Ensure that engagement efforts are broad based and fully inclusive, not solely focused on one community or one specific ideology.	It is important to counter all ideologically-motivated crime, taking into account that the appeal to committing violent actions by an individual in a community is based on a violent ideology that justifies these actions. Those undertaking community engagement and community-oriented policing efforts should therefore define the parameters of violent extremism and counter it impartially in whatever forms it may take.
GOOD PRACTICE 4	Take a holistic approach to community engagement and community-oriented policing that involves all sectors of the society in order to find the right partners and sustain the engagement.	It is important to incorporate community influencers who are not formal leaders into any engagement plan. This will ensure that engagement has the best chance of reaching a broad cross-section of individuals within the community and it also has the potential to aid in developing trust with different levels in the community. Providing local-level engagement officials with a broad range of potential partners, such as private sector businesses, national and local government agencies, NGOs, academia, local health care providers, teachers and the media, could give them more tools to respond to community needs.

GOOD PRACTICE 5	Engage women as positive change agents in their communities.	Studies have demonstrated that women tend to act the gatekeepers to their communities and, as such, should be involved in creating and maintaining CVE initiatives. Relatedly, the experience of community engagement to counter-gang recruitment shows that gang members were influenced to cease violent gang activity when they were faced with the prospect of having to explain their actions to their mothers.
GOOD PRACTICE 6	Engage youth and leverage schools for positive messages.	Given that violent extremist recruiters specifically target youth, it is the youth who should be involved hands-on to help develop projects and messages that will resonate with their peers on the dangers of violent extremism. Furthermore, placing educators and community members in schools and other relevant fora to engage at-risk youth with positive messages or to provide counselling or other services can be an effective method of CVE, and can leverage the community in actively countering violent extremism.
GOOD PRACTICE 7	Designate a specific individual to be the point person for engagement with the community.	Dedicated community liaison officers can focus solely on developing programs that build trust with the community and ensuring that law enforcement officials are aware of any violent extremism reported in a community. This can also keep traditional intelligence-gathering and community relationship-building separate.
GOOD PRACTICE 8	Empower communities to develop a counter narrative to the violent extremist narrative and amplify the alternative message through all forms of media.	When engaged in CT efforts, traditional law enforcement has tended to focus its efforts on terrorists and their active supporters. Terrorists, however, give great attention to their audience; that is how they recruit. In order to therefore counter radicalization to violence and recruitment most effectively, practitioners should work with local communities to highlight the specific locally persuasive counter-narratives that refute or negate the narrative advocating violence as the answer to perceptions of injustice inflicted on self, family or community.

GOOD PRACTICE 9	Engage both former violent extremists and victims of terrorism to communicate counter narratives at both the local and national level.	Former violent extremists who come from certain settings have innate credibility and can relate to at-risk youth who may be in similar situations as they once were. Victims of terrorism also have innate credibility because they are a testament to the violence, trauma, and suffering that terrorism can wreak. Community engagement and community-oriented policing efforts that involve former extremists or victims of terrorism carry the resonance needed to make an impactful statement.
GOOD PRACTICE 10	Tailor community engagement and community-oriented policing trainings to address the issues and dynamics of the local community and to instil awareness of potential indicators and behaviours.	To maintain the trust and respect integral to community engagement and community-oriented policing, practitioners should be trained properly on the parameters of engagement and how it relates to the local contexts where they are engaging. For example, training manuals on community-oriented policing as well as smaller "pocket guides" aimed at informing front line officers on potential behaviours and indicators to raise awareness of violent extremist threats versus behavioural norms could be distributed to local police. Furthermore, front line law enforcement should be trained on community cultural, societal, and religious behaviour and be able to distinguish it from potential criminal and violent extremist indicators and behaviours.
GOOD PRACTICE 11	Build assessment metrics into projects during concept development.	Though it is inherently difficult to prove causality, there are ways in which to measure community perceptions before, during, and after a given community engagement or community-oriented policing initiative. Such measures can take the form of polls, surveys, focus groups, or community round-tables.
GOOD PRACTICE 12	Recognize that community engagement and community-oriented policing	involve establishing, developing and sustaining enduring relationships. Devise concise metrics appropriate to measure effectiveness at each stage of that process.

Source: GTCF, 2013 ³⁹

In 2001, the UK Home Office published a report titled *Winning the Race – Embracing Diversity* which underscored the value of community intelligence:

15. “It is unlikely that the necessary link between consultation and service delivery can be securely in place unless **Community Intelligence** is a part of the information conduit. Such intelligence provides the picture of the quality of life experienced by individuals and groups. It needs to be fully integrated into an integrated intelligence strategy if its potential is to be realised. Its integration and use must be subject to the existing regulations and codes of practice governing intelligence as a whole.”⁴⁰ [Emphasis added]

The report defines community intelligence in the following terms:

“Local information, direct or indirect, that when assessed provides intelligence on the quality of life experienced by individuals and groups, that informs both the strategic and operational perspectives in the policing of local communities”.⁴¹

A 2001 police research paper entitled *Community Disorder: A Tactical Police Guide* has further elaborated on the methods and strategies required for effective community intelligence gathering and analysis.⁴² In particular the Guide notes that:

“Present systems used by police forces mainly consist of criminal intelligence upon which strategy and tactics are directed and operations based, with stand-alone tension indicator processes commonplace. Such practices fail to recognise the vast pool of intelli-

³⁹ Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, *Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as Tools to Counter Violent Extremism*, 2013.

⁴⁰ Home Office, *Winning the Race – Embracing Diversity*, 2001.

⁴¹ Home Office, *Winning the Race – Embracing Diversity*, 2001.

⁴² National Crime and Operations Faculty, *Community Disorder: A Tactical Police Guide*, 2001.

gence that exists within communities, intelligence, which must be acted upon to reduce community tensions and the potential for disorder. [...] Development of community intelligence requires an information gathering process from key sources and partners identifying, significant events, officers’ safety information, inter-group and any other incidents which may affect tension within communities. In making community intelligence work information systems must be easily accessible, simple, fast time, self-evaluated, auditable, and used by senior managers. Barriers to information exchange amongst partners must be removed. Gathering systems can include for example management reports, internal and external IT systems, incident logs, media reports and rumour networks.⁴³

The Guide outlines a list of possible mechanisms for developing community intelligence:

“Developing community intelligence is an information gathering process. Although not prescriptive some key sources of information include:

- Patrol / community beat officers or beat managers
- Police managers
- Community liaison officers
- Media
- Consultative groups
- IT systems
- Watch schemes
- Pressure groups
- Partnership agencies
- Other emergency services
- Intelligence systems
- Criminal justice system

⁴³ National Crime and Operations Faculty, *Community Disorder: A Tactical Police Guide*, 2001.

- Specialist units
- Detective units
- Hate crime investigators
- Traffic units
- Special constables
- Police support personnel
- Community contacts
- Youth
- Faith groups
- Religious leaders.⁴⁴

The Guide then goes on to suggest that:

Information which can be developed into community intelligence, can be categorised into four areas:

1. Significant events which may affect/indicate community tension:

- Incidents of disorder (sporadic violence).
- Significant anniversaries (religious/cultural, marching season).
- Public events (i.e. protests, meetings, concerts).
- Elections (right/left wing candidates) and party political rivalry.
- Police crime initiatives (drugs raids, stop and search).
- Other “extremist” events.

2. Officer safety information:

- Unusual assaults on police (officers ambushed).

⁴⁴ National Crime and Operations Faculty, *Community Disorder: A Tactical Police Guide*, 2001.

- Use of offensive weapons (increase in possession).
- Hostility to normal police activity (verbal taunts to patrol officers).

3. Inter group incidents:

- Racially motivated (black on white/white on black attacks/black on black).
- Gang rivalry between or within specific ethnic groups (drug/turf).
- Religious rivalry in or between groups.
- Youth rivalry in/between schools and colleges (group/religious).
- Asylum seekers.

4. Any other incident which may cause change in community tension:

- Hate crime (e.g. homophobic attacks).
- Vigilante patrols (pro/anti law stance).
- Threats to community safety (violent crime/robbery, offender placement).
- Graffiti (offensive, racist, gang related, anti-establishment).
- Media interest (reporting rumour, sensationalist articles).
- Sporting (football).
- Ideological (pro/anti-immigration).
- Disputes involving immediate and extended members of the family.
- Overseas incident that may have a knock on effect at national level.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ National Crime and Operations Faculty, *Community Disorder: A Tactical Police Guide*, 2001.

The Guide defines a set of key factors for the development of a community intelligence system:

- Community intelligence must be placed in the same category with criminal intelligence and afforded the same status and importance.
- An effective system will need to make provision for the collection, evaluation, analysis, development and dissemination of community intelligence.
- An Intelligence led approach will be via construction of a Community Intelligence System.⁴⁶

A list of indicative initiatives and practices for the monitoring of radicalised individuals and terrorist suspects, including the role of community policing in strengthening extremist surveillance at local level is provided in Table 7.

⁴⁶ National Crime and Operations Faculty, *Community Disorder: A Tactical Police Guide*, 2001.

Table 7: A List of Indicative Initiatives and Practices for the Monitoring of Terrorist Suspects

(note: All voices that start below are marked as "personal data collection" The final sections marked with a gray background are marked as "other")

NAME OF PRACTICE/ MEASURE / APPROACH	KEY DETAILS	TARGET AUDIENCE <i>i.e.</i> , to whom the practice addressed is	ACTOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRACTICE <i>(e.g., Government, civil society, citizens, communities, faith/ religious groups, researchers, businesses, private partners)</i>	REFERENCE
Intelligence/evidence-led policy Germany – Data mining	Development of a tool to automatically screen the data available from public and private records against a behavioural profile. Such was established on the basis of demographic and socio-economic criteria derived from the profile of the 9/11 terrorists. Those 'sleepers' were subject to closer scrutiny. → Declared unlawful and in violation of the right to privacy because unjustified by evidence of a concrete eminent threat	First responders or practitioners Law enforcement officers	Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremisms and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach, OSCE, Austria, 2014. • German Federal Constitutional Court, Abstract of the German Federal Constitutional Court's Order of 4 April 2006, 1 BvR 518/02. • Kett-Straub (G.), 'Data screening of Muslim Sleepers Unconstitutional', <i>German Law Journal</i>, Vol. 7, n° 11, 2006, pp. 967-975.
Italy – Investigative tools	Use of preventive wiretapping and communication control Trojan horse/ spyware Questioning prison inmates	Law enforcement authorities for serious crime and terrorism	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs, , EU and Member States' policies and laws on persons suspected of terrorism-related crimes, 2017, pp. 101-110.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
France's security strategy – Action plan against terrorism (Law strengthening Domestic Security and the fight against terrorism)	<p>- Allowing the administrative authority to put in place administrative controls and individual monitoring measures against any person in respect of whom there is serious reason to believe their behaviour constitutes a 'particular serious' threat and who enters into regular contact with individuals or organizations with terrorist intent or who supports or adheres to views that incite terrorism (<i>e.g.</i>, obligation to report once a day to the police or gendarmerie units, placement under electronic surveillance, obligation to provide email login details and subscriber numbers)</p> <p>- Allocation of additional human and financial resources to the intelligence services, with a special team profiling and monitoring suspected terrorists</p> <p>- Passenger Name Record to monitor the movement of individuals posing a threat</p> <p>- Legal system for surveillance and monitoring of wireless communications (<i>e.g.</i>, drones with airborne cameras, surveillance cameras)</p> <p>→ Mass surveillance? (See CJEU, C-511/18, 6 October 2020, <i>Quadrature du Net</i> regarding the access and retention of metadata: Prohibition of general and indiscriminate retention and sharing of traffic and location data as a preventive measure, except if there is a serious threat to national security)</p>	Law enforcement officers Administrative authorities	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Official website of the French Government. • French Government, Action plan against terrorism, 13 July 2018. • Court of Justice of the European Union, C-511/18, 6 October 2020, Quadrature du Net.
United Kingdom counter-terrorism strategy (data surveillance)	<p>- Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014: Retention of metadata</p> <p>- Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (challenged before the ECtHR thus require amendments): consolidation of the retention of content and metadata</p>	Law enforcement authorities	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • United Kingdom legislation, Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014. • United Kingdom legislation, Investigatory Powers Act 2016.
United Kingdom – The Tempora programme and the Massive Volume Reduction (MRV) technique	Tapping the fiber-optic cables entering and exiting the country to have access to unprecedented quantities of information. Both content (<i>e.g.</i> recordings of phone calls, content of email messages, entries on Facebook, histories of an Internet user's access to websites) and metacontent (" <i>data recording the means of creation of transmitted data, the time and date of its creation, its creator and location where it was created</i> ")	Law enforcement authorities	Governmental authorities Businesses (private-sector telecommunications companies)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bigo (D.) <i>e.a.</i>, 'Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its compatibility with EU Law', <i>CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe</i>, n°61, 2013, pp. 39-45.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
United Kingdom – Participation in the US PRISM programme	Access to wider information obtained by NSA surveillance activities (upstream collection)	Law enforcement authorities	Governmental authorities Businesses (private-sector telecommunications companies)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bigo (D.) <i>e.a.</i>, 'Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its compatibility with EU Law', <i>CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe</i>, n°61, 2013, pp. 39-45.
United Kingdom – Edghill programme	To identify and decode encrypted traffic from internet cable-tapping programme	Law enforcement authorities	Governmental authorities Businesses (private-sector telecommunications companies)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bigo (D.) <i>e.a.</i>, 'Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its compatibility with EU Law', <i>CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe</i>, n°61, 2013, pp. 39-45.
Sweden – 2009 National Defense Radio Establishment Law	Authorization to monitor all cable-bound communications traffic into and out of the country, including emails, text messages and telephone calls. Metadata stored in the 'Titan' database	Law enforcement authorities	Government offices and agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bigo (D.) <i>e.a.</i>, 'Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its compatibility with EU Law', <i>CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe</i>, n°61, 2013, pp. 45-48.
Germany – Technological Coming-of-age Programme	Collect of data through private companies	Law enforcement authorities	Governmental authorities Businesses (private-sector telecommunications companies)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bigo (D.) <i>e.a.</i>, 'Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its compatibility with EU Law', <i>CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe</i>, n°61, 2013, pp. 52-57.
Germany – Use of Federal Trojan Horses	Highly specialized software to secretly gather data on private computers and phones	Law enforcement authorities	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bigo (D.) <i>e.a.</i>, 'Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its compatibility with EU Law', <i>CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe</i>, n°61, 2013, pp. 52-57. • Burack (C.), 'German federal police use Trojan virus to evade phone encryption', <i>DW website</i>, 2018.
The Netherlands – Project Symbolon	Infiltration of computers and networks to acquire data for the monitoring of vital networks	Law enforcement authorities	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bigo (D.) <i>e.a.</i>, 'Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its compatibility with EU Law', <i>CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe</i>, n°61, 2013, pp. 57-60.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Austria – Extended danger research	Legal regime: police can observe potentially dangerous groups and individuals before criminal acts take place. This may be done by way of surveillance, covert investigations, as well as by way of video and audio records	Law enforcement authorities	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (ETC Graz), National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies – Austria, 22 September 2014. • European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (ETC Graz), National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies (legal update) – Austria, 30 June 2016.
Finland – International intelligence cooperation and methods of surveillance	<p>Proposal to change the Constitution: The proposed Act on Network Surveillance in Civilian Intelligence.</p> <p>- Section 4 'Targeting of electronic surveillance of network communications', allows for a bulk access to both content and metadata</p> <p>- Section 6 'Conditions for electronic surveillance of network communications': electronic surveillance can be used in case of a serious threat of national security.</p>	Law enforcement authorities	Civil and military intelligence services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ojanen (T.) and Lavapuro (J.), Monthly data collection on the current reform of intelligence legislation – Finland, January–May 2017. • Muižnieks (N.), 'Human Rights in Europe Should not Buckle under Mass Surveillance', <i>Open Democracy</i>, 12 February 2016.
Italy – Urgent Measures for the Fight against Terrorism (responsive approach)	A legislation set on special investigation techniques (e.g., interceptions, wire tapes, undercover operations, financial investigations, computer searches, cyber investigations)	Law enforcement authorities for serious crime and terrorism	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Council of Europe, Committee of experts on terrorism (Codexter), Pro-files on Counter-Terrorism Capacity – Italy, November 2017.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Hungary – Strategy	<p>Secret surveillance (depending on the methods, a judicial warrant is required)</p> <p>Methods not subject to external authorization: e.g., process of personal data (including sensitive one), covert relationship, setting of traps, recordings (wiretap conversations)</p> <p>Methods subject to external authorization: e.g., searching residences in secret, unsealing letters and other postal items, recordings and using of data transferred or stored on IT devices or system (obligation for telephone or internet service providers to store traffic data and make it available to national intelligence authorities)</p> <p>- Terror emergency situation (extraordinary measures)</p> <p>- Obligation for all telecommunication service providers to stop all measures that could prevent the decoding of communication</p> <p>- Monitoring of transactions on certain individuals' bank accounts</p> <p>- International cooperation between units of EU Member States</p> <p>> Anti-terror spy law in breach with the right to privacy: ECtHR, Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, 12 January 2016, application no. 37138/14</p>	Law enforcement authorities	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hungarian Helsinki Committee, National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies – Hungary, 26 September 2014. • Milieu Ltd., National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies (legal update) – Hungary, 30 June 2016. • Hungary, Act CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services (A nemzetbiztonsági szolgálatokról szóló 1995. évi CXXV. törvény), 27 March 1996. • Hungary, Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police (A Rendőrségről szóló 1994. évi XXXIV. törvény), 1 May 1994. • Hungary, Act LIV of 2002 on the international cooperation of law enforcement bodies (2002. évi LIV. törvény a bűnüldöző szervek nemzetközi együttműködéséről), 1 April 2003. • ECtHR, Application no. 37138/14, Case of Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, 12 January 2016. • ECtHR, Hungarian legislation on secret anti-terrorist surveillance does not have sufficient safeguards against abuse, Press release ECHR 014 (2016), 12 January 2016.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Luxembourg – Strategy	Specific and selective surveillance and monitoring by appropriate technical means of communications	Law enforcement authorities First responders	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Etudes et Formation S.A. Volha Vysotskaya and Ana Rita Ramires Campino, National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies – Luxembourg, FRA Report, 2 October 2014. • Brainiac, S.A.R.L., National intelligence authorities and surveillance in the EU: Fundamental rights safeguards and remedies (legal update) – Luxembourg, 1 July 2016. • Luxembourg, Act of 15 June 2004 on the organisation of the State Intelligence Service (Loi du 15 juin 2004 portant organisation du Service de Renseignement de l'Etat). • Luxembourg, amended Act of 15 June 2004 on the organisation of the State Intelligence Service (Loi du 15 juin 2004 portant organisation du Service de Renseignement de l'Etat), 12 July 2014.
Prüm system – Forensic DNA database	Technological identification system developed to enable DNA data exchange across EU Member States in the context of police and judicial cooperation to control cross-border crime and terrorism	Police and judicial practitioners	EU Member States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Machado (H.), Granja (R.) and Amelung (N.), ‘Constructing Suspicion Through Forensic DNA Databases in the EU. The Views of the Prüm Professionals’, <i>The British Journal of Criminology</i>, Vol. 60, Issue n°1, January 2020, pp. 141-159.
China – Surveillance technology	Use of sensors, big data Facial recognition scans to enter markets, buy fuel or use public transportation Monitoring messages and data on phone through apps Collect of biometric data (DNA, fingerprints, iris scans)	Governmental authorities Public and private businesses	Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Byman (D.), Is China Prepared For Global Terrorism? Xinjind and Beyond, Global China: Assessing China's Growing Role in the World, September 2019.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Poland – Strategy: 2016 Surveillance and Anti-Terrorism Laws	<p>Foreign nationals are considered terrorists suspects. Police officers can arrest individuals based on a probability that they were going to commit or had committed a terrorist act.</p> <p>Once there are suspicions, anti-terrorist regulations are applied: a person may become a target of surveillance conducted by security institutions (cf. operational surveillance measures)</p>	Law enforcement authorities First responders	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gasztold (A.) and Gasztold (P.) ‘The Polish Counterterrorism System and Hybrid Warfare Threats’, <i>Terrorism and Political Violence</i>, 25 June 2020. • Rojszczak (M.), ‘Surveillance, Legal Restraints and Dismantling Democracy. Lessons from Poland’, <i>Democracy and Security</i>, Vol. 17, Issue n°1, 2021, pp. 1-29. • Rosicki (R.), ‘Counter-Terrorist Security: The Example of the Special Powers of the Polish Special Services in the Field of Surveillance of Foreign Nationals’, <i>Przegląd Strategiczny</i> n°11, 2018, p. 266. • Act of 15 January 2016 on the Amendment to the Police Act and Certain Other Acts. Polish Journal of Laws of 2016, item 147. • Poland, Act of 10 June 2016 on Anti-Terrorist Activities. Polish OJ of 2016, item 452.
Spain – Counter-terrorism strategy (holistic approach)	<p>Task of investigating jihadi groups by sifting through social media accounts, investigating religious congregations known to harbor extremists and working with informers to gain knowledge of terrorist networks</p> <p>Spain's current strategy rests on a coordination between various bodies and international agencies and takes into consideration multiple factors to fight against the traction of Islamist extremist ideology</p>	Law enforcement authorities First responders	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ballesteros (A.), ‘Counter-terrorism efforts in Spain’, <i>Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses</i>, Vol 10, n° 11, 2018, pp. 9-13.
Use of drones	To track down suspects, aerial surveillance/reconnaissance	Law enforcement authorities (civil and military)	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yaacoub (J.-P.), <i>e.a.</i>, ‘Security analysis of Drones Systems: Attacks, Limitations, and Recommendations’, <i>Internet of Things</i>, Vol. 11, 2020.
Facial recognition	The automatic identification and matching of a person's face	Law enforcement authorities for serious crime and terrorism	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Facial recognition technology: fundamental rights considerations in the context of law enforcement, 21 November 2019.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Greece – Special investigating acts for terrorism-related offences and other serious offences	Special investigation (covert police operations, lifting or privacy, surveillance of activities that occur outside a residence and the use of personal data residence) but not without prior approval from a supervising public prosecutor	Law enforcement authorities for serious crime and terrorism	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs, EU and Member States' policies and laws on persons suspected of terrorism-related crimes, 2017, pp. 95-100.
Sweden – Protection against terrorism in crowded places (guidance)	Camera surveillance, security checks, identification of suspicious behaviours	Law enforcement authorities Individuals	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), Guideline on Protection of Public Spaces - Protection against terrorism in crowded places, October 2019.
Arrest and pre-trial detention of terrorist suspects (preventive detention)	Authorized by the ECHR, as long as it does not infringe the ECHR. Must be justified (reasonable grounds) and the length of detention should not exceed a reasonable time.	First responders	Member States of the Council of Europe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Council of Europe, HELP COURTalks / disCOURs: Terrorism. Elias (S.), "Rethinking "preventive detention" from a comparative perspective: three frameworks for detaining terrorist suspects", <i>Columbia Human Rights Law Review</i>, Vol. 41, Issue n°99, 2009, pp. 99-210.
EU Terrorist lists	A list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts and subject to restrictive measures involving the freezing of funds and other financial assets, as well as enhanced measures related to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters	Governmental authorities Businesses	EU Member States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Council, EU Terrorist List.
Slovenia – Biometric systems	Relative effectiveness of this method of identification and mass surveillance to catch terrorists	Law enforcement authorities	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Brumnik (R.), e.a., The Efficiency of Biometric Systems in Fight against Terrorism, University of Zilina (Transcom conference), 2011.
Slovakia – Integrated intelligence model	Legislation: Division of intelligence services and police agencies; Secret surveillance –process of extending surveillance powers; Electronic collect of data	Law enforcement authorities	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Kolazyński (M.), "Overseeing surveillance powers – the cases of Poland and Slovakia", <i>The Policy of National Security</i>, Vol. 18, n°1, 2020, pp. 69-85. Mendoza (L.), Pavolka (D.) and Nižňanský (J.), European response to terrorism: the cases of Spain and Slovakia, Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic, 2006.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Electronic control bracelets (electronic surveillance)	To monitor suspected terrorist	Law enforcement authorities	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seron (V.) and André (S.), "30 measures against terrorism: penal populism between expected efficiency and potential collateral damage", in Thomas Renard eds., <i>Counter-Terrorism in Belgium: Key Challenges and Policy Options</i>, Egmont Institute, 2016, pp.10-22.
Bulgaria – Strengthening IT Security (integrated automated security system)	Video surveillance system 'Sofia safe city'	Law enforcement authorities	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tumbaraska (A.), "The Non-Lethal Technologies Against the Terrorism", <i>European Journal of Engineering Research and Science</i>, Vol. 3 n°5, May 2018, pp. 41-46.
Mass surveillance measures from the perspective of the UN Sustainable Development Goals	Impetus of those measures of surveillance Current problems of profiling/defining deviance and of false positives	Law enforcement authorities	States in General, regarding the UN Sustainable Development Goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Spapens (T.), "Surveillance and the Impossible Search for Ideal Behaviour", in Kury (H.) and Redo (S.), <i>Crime Prevention and Justice in 2030</i>, Springer, 2021, pp. 339-353. Shortland (N.) and Forest (J.J.F.), "Tracking Terrorism: The Role of Technology in Risk Assessment and Monitoring of Terrorist Offenders", in Fox (B.), Reid (J.) and Masys (A.), <i>Science Informed Policing. Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications</i>, Springer, 2020, pp. 56-57.
Community policing – Nudge theory	Ways to build and strengthen a partnership between police and local Muslim communities to prevent and detect Islamic extremism	Muslim communities Police officers	Local community Civil society Law enforcement authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Li (E.), "Can "Nudge" Salvage Community Policing against Terrorism?", <i>Terrorism and Political Violence</i>, 2021.
French police system – reinforcement of the role of local authorities in public security policies		Local police organizations	Local authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> De Maillard (J.) and Skogan (W.), <i>Policing in France</i>, Routledge, 2020.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
UK 'building community resilience' approach	Civic resilience concept –to rebuild civil society (and not focusing only on Muslim communities) using values of national security	Civil society and local communities	Local communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> West (J.), 'Civic resilience: securing "resilient communities" to prevent terrorism', in David Chandler and Jon Coaffee, eds. <i>The Routledge Handbook of International Resilience</i>, Routledge, 2016.
Civil Society and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy	Raising awareness among groups that States have little influence over Promoting tolerance	Religious and media leaders Local communities Civil society and families Educational institutions	NGOs Local communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rosand (E.) e.a., Civil Society and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Opportunities and Challenges, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, September 2008. Von Einsiedel (S.), Assessing the UN's Efforts to Counter Terrorism, UN University Centre for Policy Research, Paper 8, October 2016. Veenkamp (I.) and Zeiger (S.), 'Countering Violent Extremism: Program and policy approaches relating to youth through education, families and communities', in Marco Lombardi et al. eds., <i>Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism Among Youth to Prevent Terrorism</i>, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series, Vol. 118, pp. 151-163.
The Netherlands – Slotervaart	Deradicalization strategy: 7 Muslim police officers were given the task of reestablishing contact with the Muslim population	Muslim officers	Local authorities	Rabasa (A.) e.a., Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists , RAND Corporation, 2010.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Intelligence/evidence-led policy Stop-and-search powers	Devolution of powers to police services to stop and search people, even those not suspected of any involvement in a crime → Controversial because of the stigmatization of certain particular national, ethnic or religious groups.	Law enforcement officers	Government Organisations/ ONGs (to limit ethnic profiling)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremisms and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach, OSCE: Vienna (Austria), 2014. Lennon (G.), 'Precautionary tales: Suspicionless counter-terrorism stop and search', <i>Criminology and Criminal Justice</i>, Vol. 15, n° 1, 2015, pp. 44-62. Open Society Justice Initiative, Reducing Ethnic Profiling in the European Union: Handbook of Good Practices, Open Society Foundations, 2012.

5. Addressing the risk of returning foreign fighters, terrorist supporters, and terrorist recruiters

Foreign fighter returnees are a major security concern, not least because of their battlefield experience, training in the use of weapons and connections to international terrorist networks.⁴⁷ The desensitisation to the use of violence, combined with stressful combat experience further increases the potential threat posed by returnees, including the risk of recidivism and further engagement in atrocities. However, while some foreign fighter returnees would seek to continue their engagement in violence, others may perceive themselves as victims to terrorist groups or remain hesitant to commit attacks in their countries of ordinary residence.⁴⁸ Still others may altogether reject violence as a means of attaining their goals, largely as a result of extremely traumatic experiences that they have had or witnessed in conflict zones. Thus, a nuanced approach for addressing the wide range of social and security concerns posed by the different types of returning foreign fighters is required.

Govier and Boutland note that public safety is a major issue in the case of returning foreign fighters, as even a few seeking terrorist involvement and achieving success can do enormous damage; in other words, dangers arise even if not every returnee is a threat.⁴⁹ They point out that there are three main strategies for dealing with the multifaceted security concerns posed by returning foreign fighters. The first is a legal approach which entails that returnees suspected of committing or supporting atrocities need to be

⁴⁷ *Foreign Fighter Returnees and the Reintegration Challenge*, RAN Issue Paper, 2016.

⁴⁸ *Foreign Fighter Returnees and the Reintegration Challenge*, RAN Issue Paper, 2016.

⁴⁹ Trudy Govier and David Boutland, '[Dilemmas regarding ISIS Fighters](#)', *Ethics and Global Politics*, Vol. 13:2, 2020, pp. 93-107.

identified, detained, and charged with criminal acts; they need to be tried and if possible convicted on the basis of procedural justice and appropriate legal grounds; if applicable, they may be imprisoned in acceptable facilities; and, eventually, released and reintegrated safely into the receiving society.⁵⁰ Despite appearing as the obvious one, the legal approach is far from straightforward. For one thing, it requires a solid legal foundation and evidence, the latter often being difficult to collect in time of conflict. There is also the additional risk that once in prison, the once active terrorist fighters will try to spread extremist ideas among other inmates and recruit other offenders to engage in violent behaviour. Another possible approach is to prevent those who have been involved in atrocities abroad the right of return. A knock-out effect of the implementation of this approach in the EU has been the framing of migration and border control as elements of the EU counter-terrorism policy.⁵¹ A third option for dealing with foreign terrorist fighters is to try and re-integrate them back into their communities.⁵² In this regard, the *Routledge Handbook of Deradicalisation and Disengagement* provides an extensive overview of existing initiatives, practices, and case studies that could offer guidance in developing effective local and national strategies for dealing with returning terrorist fighters.⁵³

⁵⁰ Trudy Govier and David Boutland, '[Dilemmas regarding ISIS Fighters](#)', *Ethics and Global Politics*, Vol. 13:2, 2020, pp. 93-107. See also Vera Mironova, *The Challenge of Foreign Fighters. Repatriating and Prosecuting ISIS Detainees*, MEI Policy Center, January 2021.

⁵¹ Christopher Baker-Beall, '[The Threat of the 'Returning Foreign Fighter': The Securitization of EU Migration and Border Control Policy](#)', *Security Dialogue*, vol. 50:5 (2019). See also Sarah Leonard, '[The Use and Effectiveness of Migration Controls as a Counter-Terrorism Instrument in the European Union](#)', *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, Vol. 4:1 (2010), pp. 32-50.

⁵² Trudy Govier and David Boutland, '[Dilemmas regarding ISIS Fighters](#)', *Ethics and Global Politics*, Vol. 13:2, 2020, pp. 93-107.

⁵³ Stig Hansen and Stian Lid, *Routledge Handbook of Deradicalisation and Disengagement*, Routledge, 2020. See also Radicalisation Awareness Network, *Responses to Returnees: Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Their Families*, RAN collection, July 2017; Rik Coolsaet and Thomas Renard eds. *Returnees: Who are They, Why are They (Not) Coming Back, and How Should We Deal with Them? Assessing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherland*, Egmont Royal Institute for International Affairs, Egmont Paper No 101, 2018.

As part of its “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” (FTF) Initiative, the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) has adopted the *The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon*.⁵⁴ This Memorandum notes that:

“FTFs can have an impact on origin, transit, and destination countries, including in planning operations and facilitating the influx of recruits and arms, as well as increasing the proliferation of the terrorist threat upon their return to their home or third countries with potential violent extremist indoctrination and/or affiliation, operational knowledge or experience in terrorist attacks, and training. Subsequent to their return, whether operating independently (“lone actors”) or as a part of a group, there is a risk that FTFs can commit terrorist acts or promote violence, provide guidance and operational expertise, raise funds, and/or serve as recruiters to radicalize and more broadly encourage others to violence in their State of residence or nationality or in other States.”⁵⁵

In light of these complex challenges, the Memorandum presents a set of indicative good practices that are intended to inform and guide governments as they develop policies, programs, and approaches to address the FTF phenomenon.⁵⁶ Box 2 gives an overview of the suggested good practices.

⁵⁴ Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, *The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon*, 2013.

⁵⁵ Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, *The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon*, 2013.

⁵⁶ Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, *The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon*, 2013.

Box 2: Good Practices for Responding to the FTF Phenomenon

GOOD PRACTICE 1 Invest in the long-term cultivation of trusted relationships with communities susceptible to recruitment, considering the broader set of issues and concerns affecting the community.

GOOD PRACTICE 2 Develop a wide range of proactive, positive counter-narratives and alternative activities, offering non-violent, productive alternatives to help those in need, as well as means to channel frustration, anger, and concerns without turning to violence.

GOOD PRACTICE 3 Bring together social media, analytic experts, and technology innovators to develop and produce compelling counter-narrative content.

GOOD PRACTICE 4 Empower those who are best-placed to affect change, including youth, families, women, and civil society, to take ownership in the development and messaging of positive counter-narratives to the violent extremist agenda.

GOOD PRACTICE 5 Prevent the identification of the FTF phenomenon or violent extremism with any religion, culture, ethnic group, nationality, or race.

II.
Preventing, Detecting and Intervening Against Recruitment and Facilitation
Traditional recruitment and facilitation networks operated by established terrorist organizations which may target specific communities persist in some environments, while Internet-based radicalization may occur in others. In between these two extremes are hybrid models that take advantage of the Internet's scale and anonymity while retaining some elements of the traditional model, such as ethnic or linguistic affinity.

GOOD PRACTICE 6 Reach out to communities to develop awareness of the FTF threat and build resilience to violent extremist messages.

GOOD PRACTICE 7 Collect and fuse detailed information from government agencies, front line workers, communities, and social media to detect recruitment and facilitation while respecting the rule of law and human rights.

GOOD PRACTICE 8 Pool resources, share information, and collaborate with the private sector to curb online recruitment of FTFs.

GOOD PRACTICE 9 Adopt tailored and targeted approaches for CVE responses to radicalization and recruitment, based on the specific motivational factors and intended audience.

III.
Detecting and Intervening Against Travel and Fighting
A significant proportion of FTFs are not known to authorities before they travel, making it difficult to detect when they enter the international travel system or to provide other States sufficient warning to interdict them en route. FTFs may travel to destination countries directly or try to disguise their travel by first transiting through third countries.

GOOD PRACTICE 10 Increase the sharing of local public, law enforcement and intelligence information and analysis, and corresponding best practices, through bilateral relationships and multilateral fora to prevent FTF travel.

GOOD PRACTICE 11 Develop and implement appropriate legal regimes and administrative procedures to effectively prosecute and mitigate the risk posed by FTFs.

GOOD PRACTICE 12 Apply appropriate screening measures designed to disrupt FTF travel, with particular attention to air travel.

GOOD PRACTICE 13 Use all available tools to prevent the misuse of travel documents for FTF travel.

GOOD PRACTICE 14 Increase the capacity of States to prevent FTF travel across land borders and, more broadly, take appropriate measures to prevent FTFs within their territory from planning or preparing for terrorist acts to be carried out at home or abroad.

IV.
Detecting and Intervening Upon Return
The existence of a range of motivational factors creates challenges for detecting, intervening, and engaging with returnees. Governments also often experience challenges in prosecuting returnees and/or referring them to prevention, disengagement, and rehabilitation programs.

GOOD PRACTICE 15 Use as wide as possible a range of information sources to anticipate and detect returnees.

GOOD PRACTICE 16 Build and use evidence-based, individual-level risk assessment frameworks for returnees, evaluate their condition and establish appropriate engagement approaches accordingly.

GOOD PRACTICE 17 Strengthen investigations and prosecutions of FTFs, when appropriate, through improved information sharing and evidence gathering.

GOOD PRACTICE 18 Prepare and exercise responses to the kinds of terrorist acts for which FTFs may have special skills.

GOOD PRACTICE 19 Develop comprehensive reintegration programs for returning FTFs.

Source: GCTF, 2013.⁵⁷

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has published *Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of 'Foreign Terrorist Fighters' within a Human Rights Framework* which seek to provide States with policy recommendations, and supporting analysis, on some of the key human rights issues that they must grapple with as they seek to respond to the threats posed by FTFs in a manner that is consistent with human rights and the rule of law.⁵⁸ In a rapidly evolving environment, these Guidelines are intended to serve as a springboard for the further exchange of ideas, and sharing of good practices within and outside of the OSCE on addressing the challenges posed by FTFs in a manner responsive to security needs and compliant with human rights standards.⁵⁹ A list of indicative initiatives, approaches, and practices for addressing the risks posed by foreign terrorist fighters is provided in Table 8.

⁵⁷ Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, *The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon*, 2013.

⁵⁸ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), *Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of 'Foreign Terrorist Fighters' within a Human Rights Framework*, OSCE, 2018.

⁵⁹ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), *Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of 'Foreign Terrorist Fighters' within a Human Rights Framework*, OSCE, 2018.

Table 8: A List of Indicative Practices and Initiatives for Dealing with Returning Terrorist Fighters

(note: All voices that start below are marked as "reintegration" The final sections marked with a gray background are marked as "other")

NAME OF PRACTICE/ MEASURE / APPROACH	KEYWORDS DETAILS	TARGET AUDIENCE <i>i.e.</i> , to whom the practice addressed is	ACTOR IMPLEMENTING THE PRACTICE <i>(e.g., Government, civil society, citizens, communities, faith/ religious groups, researchers, businesses, private partners)</i>	REFERENCE
Handling on a case-by-case basis ISIS returning fighters, and classification depending on the threat they constitute	'Low-risk' returnees participate in rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives 'High-risk' returnees are subject to a range of administrative measures	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners First responders Administrative authorities	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Parliamentary Research Service, <i>The return of foreign fighters to EU soil</i>, May 2018.
Denmark – Aarhus approach and 'De-radicalisation – Back on Track' project	The Danish programme is based on holistic collaborative efforts between various public, private and people sector agencies. It draws benefits from previous initiatives and processes that were designed to tackle criminal activity as opposed to programmes that are directly related to radicalisation or extremism. It has been developed through trial and error by various local agency practitioners, comprising schools, youth clubs and social services. The Danish state plays a role in providing guidelines and receives feedback from practitioners before programme implementation. Even though this programme seeks to address the FTF issue, it also serves as an important strategy to prevent radicalisation and extremism from taking root in Danish societies. The programme targets Islamist radicalisation and the other strands of religious and political radicalisation – both left and right wing.	Support from family, friends, local mosque, etc. Civil society/ community	Government NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hassan (A.), 'Denmark's De-radicalisation Programme for Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters', <i>Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research</i>, Vol. 11, n°3, March 2019, pp. 13-16. Govier (T.) and Boutland (D.), 'Dilemmas regarding returning ISIS fighters', <i>Ethics & Global Politics</i>, Vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 93-107, available at: Butt (R.) and Tuck (H.), <i>European Counter-Radicalisation and De-radicalisation: A Comparative Evaluation of Approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany</i>, Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Systemic exit counselling – Legato Key-client model	Special program for counselling returnees	Families Violent extremists First responders or practitioners Practitioners Practitioners and guards in prison	NGOs Civil society/ Local community Governmental authorities	• RAN Collection of Approaches and Practices, <i>Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism</i> , 2019 Edition, pp.71.
The Netherlands – Reintegration strategy	To improve the reintegration of extremist offenders while still in detention, better aftercare upon release and central and coordinated approach	Prison staff Civil society	Government NGOs Civil society/ Community	• Heide (L.) and Schuurman (B.), ' Reintegrating Terrorists in the Netherlands: Evaluating the Dutch approach ', <i>Journal for Deradicalization</i> , no. 17, Winter 2018/2019.
Germany – EXIT Deutschland	Assistance, case-management, raising awareness (discarding extreme right-wing ideologies)/ prevention	Local authorities Local communities Civil society	Scholars and practitioners Police authorities	• EXIT Deutschland , 2 nd edition, 2014.
Germany – National counter-terrorism strategy, namely deradicalization and reintegration	Reintegration strategy Process as soon as possible, starting in prison (notably to prevent returnees from recruiting other inmates)	First responders Law enforcement officers Prison staff	Government	• Govier (T.) and Boutland (D.), ' Dilemmas regarding returning ISIS fighters ', <i>Ethics & Global Politics</i> , Vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 93-107. Braun (K.), ' Home, Sweet Home: Managing Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Germany, the United Kingdom and Australia ', <i>International Community Law Review</i> , Vol. 20, Issue n°3-4, July 2018, pp. 311-346. • The Institute of World Politics, ' Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Germany: An Assessment of the Threat and Strategy Options ', <i>IWP Student Journal</i> 2019.
Assimilation strategy	Integration of individuals that are likely to be subject to radicalization in society, to impede ISIS supporters from recruiting them	Official authorities Local community Civil society NGOs	Government	• Benmelech (E.) and Klor (E.), <i>What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS?</i> , April 2016.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Sweden – Exit Fryshuset	To leave radicalized groups and support them in establishing new lives with economic and social support structures to make their new lives sustainable	Civil society Local community NGOs		• Butt (R.) and Tuck (H.), <i>European Counter-Radicalisation and De-radicalisation: A Comparative Evaluation of Approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany</i> , Institute for Strategic Dialogue.
Finland – Aggreði Helsinki/Missio Program	To create and develop a system for providing otherwise hard-to-reach clients with interactive support services and developing therapeutic methods for working with clients that have engaged in violence	Health care practitioners/ Therapists Civil society	NGOs	• Butt (R.) and Tuck (H.), <i>European Counter-Radicalisation and De-radicalisation: A Comparative Evaluation of Approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany</i> , Institute for Strategic Dialogue.
The Netherlands – Children of ISIS	Minors returning from ISIS-held territory are individually assessed to determine the appropriate care, security measures and interventions that are required for their reintegration.	Civil societies Health care practitioners	Government Local authorities	• National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism and the General Intelligence and Security Service, <i>The Children of ISIS. The indoctrination of minors in ISIS-held territory</i> , 2017.
Restriction of movement	Refusal to issue or seizure/invalidation of identity cards and passports Obligation to receive police approval to travel to certain areas	Administrative authorities Law enforcement authorities	Government	• European Parliamentary Research Service, <i>The return of foreign fighters to EU soil</i> , May 2018.
Deprivation of citizenship	Keep out strategy Unless the person would be left stateless, possibility to revoke or deprive one's citizenship (e.g., Germany, UK)	Judicial practitioners	Government	• Govier (T.) and Boutland (D.), ' Dilemmas regarding returning ISIS fighters ', <i>Ethics & Global Politics</i> , Vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 93-107. • European Parliamentary Research Service, <i>The return of foreign fighters to EU soil</i> , May 2018.
Expanding existing national criminal codes (criminalization)	National criminal justice systems E.g., Belgium broadened the definition of what constitutes a terrorist offence	Judicial practitioners	Legislative authorities	• Govier (T.) and Boutland (D.), ' Dilemmas regarding returning ISIS fighters ', <i>Ethics & Global Politics</i> , Vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 93-107.
In absentia investigation before ISIS fighters return	National criminal justice systems Monitoring of potential returnees, investigation, and prosecution <i>in absentia</i>	Law enforcement authorities	Government	• Govier (T.) and Boutland (D.), ' Dilemmas regarding returning ISIS fighters ', <i>Ethics & Global Politics</i> , Vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 93-107.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Protecting child returnees	Possibility of juvenile detention if the child is classified as a security threat. Otherwise, social care mechanisms are applied.	Social care services Law enforcement authorities Judicial practitioners	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Parliamentary Research Service, <i>The return of foreign fighters to EU soil</i>, May 2018.
Prison - Concentration of terrorism perpetrators (containment)	Separation from other inmates to impede proselytism	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners First responders	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ronco (D.), Sbraccia (A.) and Torrente (G.), <i>Prison de-radicalization strategies, programmes and risk assessment tools in Europe</i>, European Prison Observatory, 2019. Radicalisation Awareness Network, <i>Responses to returnees: Foreign terrorist fighters and their families</i>, RAN collection, July 2017.
Prison - Dispersion of terrorism perpetrators (dispersal)	To avoid the mutual reinforcement between radicals	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners First responders	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ronco (D.), Sbraccia (A.) and Torrente (G.), <i>Prison de-radicalization strategies, programmes and risk assessment tools in Europe</i>, European Prison Observatory, 2019. European Commission, <i>Responses to returnees: Foreign terrorist fighters and their families</i>, RAN collection, July 2017, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ran_br_a4_m10_en.pdf
Prison – Combination of dispersal and containment	Tailor-made response to individual needs/ risks	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners First responders	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Radicalisation Awareness Network, <i>Responses to returnees: Foreign terrorist fighters and their families</i>, RAN collection, July 2017.
Specific prison regime: maximum security and supervision	In Latvia, Italy, or Spain (Files of Inmates under Special Monitoring)	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners First responders	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ronco (D.), Sbraccia (A.) and Torrente (G.), <i>Prison de-radicalization strategies, programmes and risk assessment tools in Europe</i>, European Prison Observatory, 2019.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Special wings and training prison staff to handle ISIS returning fighters	Day-to-day relationships between staff and offenders are crucial in maintaining a safe and secure prison environment. With the number of returnees in prisons expected to rise, investment in training designated staff is imperative.	Prison/ probation/ judicial practitioners First responders	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Commission, <i>Responses to returnees: Foreign terrorist fighters and their families</i>, RAN collection, July 2017.
Facilitating evidence gathering (prosecution tactic)	Evidentiary tactics Internet evidence and battlefield evidence and intelligence	First responders	Governmental authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Parliamentary Research Service, <i>The return of foreign fighters to EU soil</i>, May 2018.
The RAN CoE Returnee 45 model	Is a risk investigative tool to be used in relation to FTF returnees in order to help organise reflection and operational planning for possible interventions, and to reduce the threat of violence. It is a framework for general investigation into the motivation, levels of commitment and other risk factors throughout the FTF process – from leaving to returning. provides a template for the multi-agency response to organise operational data on returnees so that specific focus areas can be identified and isolated when planning interventions. It serves as a checklist, allowing the intervention specialist a quick overview of risk levels so that an identified issue may be further investigated.	Health experts Police specialists	Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> European Commission, <i>Responses to returnees: Foreign terrorist fighters and their families</i>, RAN collection, July 2017.
Repatriation of children	Offer help to children who were either taken to the conflict zone by their parents or were born there	Governmental authorities	Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dworkin (A.), <i>Beyond good and evil: Why Europe should bring ISIS foreign fighters home</i>, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2019.
Repatriating ISIS members to Europe	Notably to avoid trial <i>in absentia</i>	Governmental authorities	Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dworkin (A.), <i>Beyond good and evil: Why Europe should bring ISIS foreign fighters home</i>, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2019, pp. 15-17.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
New Zealand strategy for returning foreign fighters	Repatriation and prosecution No deprivation of citizenship	Law enforcement authorities Custom officers	Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hoffman (A.) and Furlan (M.), <i>Challenges posed by returning foreign fighters</i>, March 2020. Smith (C.), <i>Border security and counter terrorism – the New Zealand Experience</i>, 2015, Vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 24-26. Zelin (A.), <i>'New Zealand's jihadis'</i>, <i>New Zealand International Review</i>, pp. 13-17, 2015.
ASEAN – Asian returning foreign fighters	Repatriation Relocation Cooperative Security	Officials	Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Suryadi (M.), Gustarina (F.), <i>'Fronting the Return of Foreign Terrorist Fighters: The Rise and Fall of ASEAN Border Cooperation to Combat Non-Traditional Threats'</i>, <i>Jurnal Hubungan Internasional</i>, Vol. 7, no. 1, April-September 2018. Kenneth (Y.) and Unaesah (R.), <i>'Southeast Asia: Returning Foreign Fighters'</i>, <i>The Defense Post</i>, June 2020.
Criminal justice response through the domestic application of international law regarding war crimes and acts of genocide	Analysis of the international and national legal avenues available to States for prosecuting returning foreign fighters	Law enforcement authorities	Government International and European organizations/courts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Matthews (K.), <i>'Justice for the Victims: How Canada Should Manage Returning Foreign Fighters'</i>, <i>Canadian Global Affairs Institute</i>, 2018. Govier (T.) and Boutland (D.), <i>'Dilemmas regarding ISIS fighters'</i>, <i>Ethics and Global Politics</i>, Vol. 13, no. 2, 2020, pp. 93-107.
Limits and challenges of rehabilitation programs	Distinction must be made between repentant returnees, and those who continue to harbor ideological commitment to the cause	Civil society Local community on the one hand, and first practitioners/ officials	Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Holmer (G.) and Shtuni (A.), <i>Returning Foreign Fighters and the Reintegration Imperative</i>, US Institute of Peace, 2017.

NAME	DETAILS	AUDIENCE	ACTOR	REFERENCE
Indonesia – BNPT's method	Rehabilitation: dismantling returning foreign fighters' religious and political views and reinstalling a sense of nationalism	State social actors Civil society Local community	NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sumpter (C.), <i>Returning Indonesian Extremists: Unclear Intentions and Unprepared Responses</i>, ICCT Policy Brief, July 2018. Sumpter (C.), <i>'Countering violent extremism in Indonesia: priorities, practice and the role of civil society'</i>, <i>Journal for Deradicalization</i>, 2017, pp. 112-147.



PRE-RIGHTS



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